discussion paper

FS I 98 - 305

Industrial Restructuring and Industrial Relations in the European Car Industry.

Instruments and strategies for employment

Bob Hancké

November 1998
ISSN Nr. 1011-9523

e-mail: Hancké@medea.wz-berlin.de

Many thanks go to Delphine Corteel and Steve Casper for comments on a previous version, as well as to the participants in seminars organised by the European Metalworkers' Federation for their criticisms and comments. The final responsibility is, as usual, only mine. The research for this discussion paper was supported by the European Metalworkers' Federation.

ZITIERWEISE/CITATION

Bob Hancké

Industrial Restructuring and Industrial Relations in the European Car Industry.
Instruments and strategies for employment

Discussion Paper FS I 98 -305
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 1998

Forschungsschwerpunkt:
Arbeitsmarkt und Beschäftigung

Research Area:
Labour Market and Employment

Abteilung:
Wirtschaftswandel und Beschäftigung

Research Unit:
Economic Change and Employment

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin
e-mail: wzb@wz-berlin.de
Internet: http://www.wz-berlin.de

Abstract

This paper deals with the situation in the European car industry since the crisis of the early 1990s. After a short review of the structural problems of the industry and the main responses by car manufacturers, the discussion shifts to a detailed analysis of labour union responses. The paper discusses two broad stages in labour responses. The first consisted of the traditional social plans and early retirement measures that had been at the core of labour union strategies before. The second is a broader strategy, which trades working time reduction, working time flexibility and wage concessions for job security and investment guarantees. A detailed analysis of such agreements in five car-producing European countries --Germany, France, Spain, the UK and Belgium-- as well as two detailed case studies of the competitive dynamic between local unions in different countries prompted by these agreements --in GM Europe and Renault-- illustrates the main strengths and weaknesses of this strategy. While these agreements may be able to secure employment, they also install a competitive spiral on working conditions among unions. The paper then discusses the contours of an alternative strategy that attempts to avoid inter-union competition, and the role for institutions such as European Works Councils in this alternative.

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Studie befaßt sich mit der Situation der europäischen Autoindustrie seit der Krise Anfang der 90er Jahre. Auf eine kurze Beschreibung branchenspezifischer struktureller Probleme sowie der Reaktionen seitens der Autohersteller folgt eine detaillierte Analyse der gewerkschaftlichen Reaktionen.

Diskutiert werden zwei Schritte in diesem Reaktionsprozeß. Der erste Schritt bestand aus traditionellen Sozialplänen und Maßnahmen zum vorzeitigen Ruhestand, die schon vorher ein Kernelement gewerkschaftlicher Strategien ausgemacht hatten. Der zweite Schritt beinhaltet eine breitere Strategie, in welcher Arbeitszeitverkürzung, Arbeitszeitflexibilität und Lohnkonzessionen gegen Arbeitsplatz- und Investitionsgarantien eingetauscht werden sollen. Eine gründliche Untersuchung derartiger Abkommen in fünf europäischen Autoindustrien (Deutschland, Frankreich, Spanien, Großbritannien und Belgien) sowie zwei detaillierte Fallstudien der durch diese Abkommen ausgelösten kompetitiven Dynamik zwischen lokalen Gewerkschaften in verschiedenen Ländern (GM Europa und Renault) illustrieren die wesentlichen Vor-und Nachteile dieser zweiten Strategie. Während derartige Abkommen

möglicherweise Arbeitsplätze sichern helfen, führen sie gleichzeitig zu einer Wettbewerbsspirale in Bezug auf die Arbeitsbedingungen der Gewerkschaften.

Im Anschluß an diese Analyse werden die Grundzüge einer alternativen Strategie diskutiert, mit deren Hilfe zwischengewerkschaftliche Konkurrenz verhindert werden soll. Die Rolle von Institutionen, wie sie beispielsweise der Europäische Betriebsrat in dieser Alternative einnimmt, wird ebenfalls untersucht.

Table of Contents

1. The European car industry: a sector in structural crisis

Recent good news about record profits should not fool us: the European car industry is and remains a sector in crisis. Since the late 1980s, but hidden by the economic boom following German unification and therefore obvious to all only after 1992, the automobile industry in Europe has entered a period of profound restructuring. The reasons for the crisis are structural: European car markets are slowly reaching a level of saturation comparable to what the US car markets have known since the mid-1970s. Yet despite the structural weakness of demand, car manufacturers have continued to increase their production capacity and the result is currently an estimated excess capacity in Europe of the order of 25-30% (most cars made in Europe are also sold on this continent). The excess capacity follows directly from the large number of individual producers in different segments, who are all optimistic about their own market prospects and therefore have increased their capacity. In the words of management of some of the powerful German companies: “the others have excess capacity” (Piëch in Die Welt); and „there are too many cars in the world, but not enough of them are BMW“ (Berndt Pischetsrieder).

How and why we ended up in a situation of structurally depressed demand is relatively easy to understand. First of all, in comparison with the US or Japan, Europe still has many independent mass producers: ten in all, six of which compete in the same volume market (Fiat, Ford, GM Europe, PSA Group, Renault, VW Group) and the remaining four in the luxury market (BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Volvo, Audi). Furthermore, the main Japanese producers have also set up plants in the EU, as have Korean producers who are slowly showing up. Combined, there are 166 parts and final assembly plants in the European Union. This situation has created a gigantic potential over-supply. Secondly, on the demand side, things are at least as problematic: several years of austerity plans have seriously reduced the purchasing power of car buyers and since the adoption of the Maastricht criteria, this broad macro-economic problem has taken on structural characteristics. Furthermore, for the few exporters (primarily the high-end luxury car producers) the exchange rate policies of the Bundesbank and of the other central banks which were forced to follow the German Mark, have made the situation even worse. Finally, consumers see cars increasingly in a new, different and more critical light: they are regarded as

major polluters, who are making streets unsafe and creating tremendous traffic problems in all major European cities.

This problem will not find an easy solution. Instead of rationalising their production apparatus, most producers are increasing capacity, especially in the current phase of the cycle, while governments are helping national industries with subsidies, aids and new car premiums. The macro-economic regime associated with the introduction of the Euro is very likely to perpetuate the current low-growth situation; little relief is therefore to be expected from that side. One could envision new markets opening up in the Central European states or in the Newly Industrialising Countries in South-East Asia (before the current financial and economic crisis) and Latin America, but even these new growth markets are not likely to increase production in the core countries since in these regions manufacturers have set up operations that supply their home base at much lower costs than any traditional European plant could do. Additionally, because every producer is more or less in the same situation, the increased search for cost competitiveness will continue to drive up labour productivity and thus contribute to the problem, by creating ever more excess capacity.

This report discusses this crisis and its social consequences. It starts with an analytical summary of management responses (section 2), and the evolution of labour union strategies to deal with the crisis (section 3). The fourth section will be devoted entirely to a novel type of collective agreements, which aim at securing employment and investment commitments. After a review of the benefits and disadvantages of these new agreements, section 6 will discuss outlines of alternative strategies for employment security.

2. Responses by the car manufacturers

Management responded to the crisis with two strategies. The first, following the publication of the IMVP-MIT report consisted of a relentless drive to reduce production costs. This entailed a generalised introduction of lean production and cost reduction programs. In some countries where the crisis hit earlier, such as France, this process was more or less established by the late 1980s, whereas others, especially the German and Swedish industries who had been immune to the crisis of the early 1980s, were hit surprisingly hard by the crisis of the 1990s and were forced to introduce new production methods rapidly.

This micro-economic strategy, in turn, was predicated upon the introduction of new concepts of product development that allowed for a reorganisation of links with suppliers. Increasingly parts and processes were standardised, and cars were seen as collections of interchangeable modules. Such a reconfiguration of the product architecture, which finds its expression in the currently much-discussed platform strategy and the generalisation of ISO 9000 quality management standards throughout the entire European car industry are a necessity for making the new supplier policies --in any combination of forward, global and single sourcing-- a success.

The result was that many car manufacturers were able to start a slow but radical reorganisation of their product line-up, in which they were forced to increase volume through a downward extension of their product range (the much publicised moves into the high luxury end are really only that --much publicised moves-- which may well be very costly for some; this market segment may simply be too small to accommodate much competition). In other words, car manufacturers entered new, relatively lower value-added market segments, such as, for example, the VW Polo & Lupo and the Renault Twingo; and even the high-end manufacturers have gradually moved downward in the market segments: for example, Mercedes C-Class & A-Class, as well as the Swatch; the BMW 316; and the Volvo 4-series.

The second strategy follows from this new model of product architecture. In order to spread the costs of parts purchasing, more models are being built today than a few years ago. However, this led to a dramatic increase of development costs and other fixed costs associated with manufacturing, such as machinery and factories. Every model, even if it is built on the same platform as others, requires at least in part a separate development process, and in some cases the costs associated with that cover as much as the profits of two full production years of the eventual model. Furthermore, since cars have to be built on dedicated lines, this, again, raises fixed costs.

The somewhat paradoxical result of the adjustment strategies was therefore that, despite the cost reduction drive, profit margins per car actually decreased. This required producing an ever higher number of cars in order to stabilise overall corporate profit rates, which explains in large measure how we ended up with the dramatic expansion of capacity despite stagnating consumer markets, and which is also at the basis of the process of concentration we witness today (Daimler-Chrysler, VW-

SEAT-Skoda, BMW-Rover). Only an expansion of production volume allows for an amortisation of these additional costs.

The employment effects of this management-initiated restructuring program have been dramatic. Since 1991, 200.000 jobs were lost in the European car industry, and the increases we see today in some countries --Germany, Spain and to a lesser extent Belgium-- are unlikely to raise employment to the pre-1991 peak level. In fact, the generalised introduction of lean production methods and the attempts to increase outsourcing are likely to lead to more rather than less pressure on employment.

3. Trade union responses: two stages

Labour unions' analysis of the crisis went from cyclical to structural, and this shift is reflected in the strategies developed by the labour unions to deal with these new problems. At first unions attempted to use existing legal and conventional instruments to make employment reductions socially digestible. After the extent of the 1992 crisis had become clear, all car companies negotiated social plans, usually built around early retirement measures for workers over 55.

Relatively rapidly, however, this way of meeting cost pressures proved insufficient, and massive layoffs were announced: in 1992 and 1993, both VW and Mercedes announced several tens of thousands layoffs, for example, while Volvo announced the closure of its two innovative small plants in Sweden. Thus a new union strategy was adopted, which revolved around exchanging working time reduction for working time flexibility. Working time had become so important by then because it appeared to provide the basis for a new social consensus. For management it was desirable because flexible working time patterns allowed for a more rational use of equipment, whereas labour unions saw working time reduction as a way of compensating for the employment threats that resulted from excess capacity.

The working time reduction strategy became most famous with the VW agreement of 1993. Its basic idea was to cut working time by 20%, thus redistributing amount of work over a larger group of workers, but without dramatic wage cuts (in fact, VW and the unions agreed to redistribute the total yearly wage sum, including wage increases, bonuses and other premiums, over 12 months, so that the monthly net wage would remain the same, while the yearly total wage dropped some 10%). In

exchange, management obtained the installation of a flexible working time account system which allowed the company to adjust working time needs according to fluctuations in demand.

Other companies followed rapidly, and by 1995, all major car manufacturers on the continent where unions anticipated employment problems had negotiated similar working time reduction and flexibility agreements with the labour unions and works councils. By the mid-1990s, negotiated working time in most of the European car industry was between 35 and 37 hours per week, with bands between 3 and 7 hours per day to accommodate demand fluctuations.

Adjustments in working time had become so important in the European car industry, because they were related to the high sunk costs associated with investment in machinery. The amortisation of the machine park was a much more important element in the cost calculations under "lean production" than under the old system: making working time more flexible allowed for a more optimal use of these machines, i.e. use them when they were actually making cars that were sold/ordered by customers.

Gradually, this second, working time-based strategy evolved into a separate system of collective agreements, which specifically dealt with ways to secure employment and production locations in exchange for efforts by the labour unions to make working time more flexible, lower the total wage cost, contribute to a reorganisation of work, and a general commitment to support productivity increases. These latter agreements exist in many different forms in the different countries, and they are the subject of the next section.

4. Securing production and employment guarantees through collective bargaining

What follows analyses the agreements dealing with securing employment and production location, that have been concluded in Europe over the last two years from two perspectives. The first is an analysis of the type and contents of these agreements in each of the countries. As we will see, the national situation as well as the national institutional frameworks help understand the differences between different countries. The second analysis attempts to understand the pan-European dynamic for two companies where agreements to this effect have been concluded in different plants in different countries: Opel and Renault. These two cases are used to demon-

strate how the strategy in one country or plant affects the others. Without a proper international strategy, as we will see, many of these agreements end up playing out one plant against each other, and thus result in a downward competitive spiral where none of the initial advantages survive.

4.1.National analyses

Of the countries under review, Germany is the only country where agreements securing employment and production location (*"Standortsicherungsvereinbarungen"*) have explicitly been negotiated. In the other countries, however, similar agreements have been concluded, usually as a part of regular collective bargaining, and these agreements are included in the following analysis.

The analysis below is organised as follows: the first element is a sketch of the general framework, then the period, the actors, contents and the review will close with a broad stroke evaluation of the agreements. The data for the analysis were provided by the national unions (important to note that only IG Metall has produced a document specifically dealing with agreements securing employment and production location).

Germany

Agreements securing employment and production location[1] emerged in Germany in the last two to three years (with the exception of the 1993-4 VW agreement) in direct response to the restructuring in the automobile sector after the crisis of the early 1990s. All manufacturers, with the exception of BMW, have negotiated such agreements. The majority of the agreements were signed in 1996 and 1997, and they usually cover the period between 1997 and 2000. Only Ford has a longer-term agreement, dealing with broader strategic issues, and which covers the next 10 years (see below).

The agreements in Germany were negotiated between the Works councils (all IG Metall-led) and top management. In principle, the German agreements cover all the German operations of a company: no separate plant-by-plant agreements were negotiated. The Works council is also the institution that controls the application of

[1]This information is based on information provided in a document by IG Metall on Standortsicherungsvereinbarungen in the German automobile industry (on file with author). The information for the other countries was provided by the European Metalworkers' Union and the member unions in the different automobile producing countries in Europe (these documents are also on file with author).

the agreements, especially but not solely the "social" parts of the agreements such as working time, early retirement and training. An important new element in the German agreements is that they also deal with wages, a topic which formally falls outside the competencies of the works councils.

Broadly speaking, there are two types of agreements. The first is relatively conventional and is typified in the VW agreement: it deals with adjustment in personnel policies, such as working time, wages, training, etc. The second, which is concluded in Ford and Opel, is broader in scope: the most important areas of the Ford agreement are commitment to invest in particular plants, new models and capacity allocation, whereas the Opel agreement pays attention to the conventional "social" areas as well as investment guarantees and new models.

In all agreements the explicit goal is to link company competitiveness, in terms of quality, flexibility and cost, to employment security and an upgrading of work. Although none of the agreements explicitly refers to developments abroad, it is obvious from the texts that they attempt to neutralise the danger of production relocations in light of the tremendous surplus capacities that have been built up over the last five to ten years. Several measures appear in all or almost all texts: the commitment by management not to lay off workers for economic reasons and instead use the array of measures on part-time early retirement as means to reduce the workforce, implementation of new working time systems (usually trading WT reduction for flexibility), training and career planning, and the agreement to reduce wage increases for the period covered by the agreements. As said, Ford and Opel also included investment and production issues in their agreements.

In all, as this short summary suggests, these agreements solidly follow the German industrial relations model. First of all, the works council is the main agent: unions have managed to use their strong position in the company to force management to deal with restructuring in a socially viable manner. Secondly, the themes in the agreements belong to the conventional union domain: with the exception of investment commitments and the discussion about capacity distribution for the next models in Ford and Opel, as well as agreements to study insourcing as a way to secure employment, the agreements pay little attention to broader strategic management fields such as marketing, product development and work organisation. Finally, the substance of the measures proposed in the agreements follows the German de-

bate: working time reduction and flexibility, early retirement measures, wages and skills.

United Kingdom

In contrast to Germany, where every car manufacturer (with the exception of BMW) has concluded an agreement with the works council securing employment, in the UK the agreements are limited to only a few companies and, perhaps even more importantly, mainly related to very specific crises and/or decisions. Toyota, Nissan and Peugeot have not concluded agreements (the first two companies have concluded single-union agreements instead of the usual multi-union accords). Furthermore, the institutional structure of collective bargaining in the UK is such that negotiations in principle are decentralised. With the exception of the Rover agreement, the discussions take place at plant level. The agreements do not cover a particular period, but are either broad framework agreements or very specific texts to bridge a crisis. Even though the labour unions are always involved, there is no overall central framework that is then applied in the different companies.

The Rover agreement --the New Deal-- is the broadest and closest to the spirit of the German agreements. It has been negotiated with trade union officials, and deals with working time flexibility, skills, training and the deployment of workers in the organisation.

In March 1998, news spread that Vauxhall (GM) was thinking of closing one of its UK plants. Political pressure from the government and talks with the unions convinced management to reconsider the issue, and the result of the talks was a commitment by the unions to participate in a productivity drive aimed at bringing production costs in line with the German and Belgian plants, where --despite higher wages-- cars were produced at roughly two-thirds of the UK cost level. No specific measures were mentioned. If the restructuring is successful, the model following the Vectra (code-named Epsilon and scheduled to start production in 2003) will be produced in Luton.

As said before, the agreements in the UK reflect the nature of the existing institutions of collective bargaining. Not all companies are involved, agreements are decentralised, negotiated with outside union officials, mainly deal with *ad hoc* crises and can therefore be very different from one company to another.

Spain

In contrast to the other countries, no agreements securing employment are negotiated in Spain. Instead, regular collective agreements deal with related issues; however, it is important to keep in mind that car plants in Spain do not face any relocation threats: instead, most agreements are discussing an extension of production volume, employment and even modest wage increases.

The Spanish agreements follow the normal bargaining calendar, covering the period 1997-2000 and because the agreements cover the usual topics of collective bargaining, they are negotiated with the labour unions. Negotiations take place per company: all the Renault, IVECO and Nissan plants are covered by one text for each company (only Mercedes-Benz has two separate agreements for its two plants).

Two items prevail in the agreements. The first is the possibility of working time extension: many agreements leave the option of working on Saturdays and Sundays, thus increasing the total number of yearly operating days by 10 (from roughly 220 to 230). Thus, instead of working time reduction --one of the main discussion topics in Germany, France and Belgium-- Spanish agreements propose a working time extension. The second topic which recurs regularly are new hires: roughly 76.000 workers are currently employed in Spanish car factories, and the agreements schedule to hire an additional five to six thousand (by converting temporary contracts into fixed-term contracts) between 1997 and 1999.

In sum, the situation in Spain is very different from the other countries discussed: there is no crisis of production location, employment as well as production schedules are increased, and it appears as if the sector is poised for an expansion of activities over the next years.

France

The situation in France has to be seen against the background of a profound restructuring of the industry which took place in the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1980 and 1990, both Renault and Peugeot reduced their workforce in the final assembly plants by roughly half, and reorganised both their assembly operations and their entire supplier network. The result was that the French car manufacturers were the only companies to survive the crisis of the early 1990s without foregoing profitability. The workforce reduction programs, however, also entailed a serious weakening of

the labour union basis, and this is reflected in several of the agreements negotiated after 1992.

The agreements in France follow the normal bargaining calendar: almost all are concluded for a period of 3-4 years, and they are negotiated with the local labour union sections. Typical of the French situation is that not all unions have signed all agreements; however, agreements are valid even if only one of the so-called representative organisations signs.

The agreements are small in scope, but give detailed regulations on working time reduction and flexibility in exchange for which companies provide general employment guarantees and commitments for new hires. The basic idea is to trade working time flexibility, which will allow the companies to adjust production volume to fluctuations in demand, to guarantees regarding employment.

These bargaining results have to be seen in light of a corporate strategy to turn the company into a network of single-model plants, i.e. plants where in principle only one model will be produced. The agreements thus reflect the struggles between the workers in different plants for obtaining commitments to produce these models.

Parallel to what happened in the other countries, the French agreements reflect the nature of French labour relations: competitive unionism produces "lowest common denominator" agreements, while the weakness of French unions on the shop-floor makes both a co-ordinated bargaining strategy and a constructive follow-up of the agreements very hard to pursue.

Belgium

Belgian car plants are in a very particular situation: they are all subsidiaries of companies who have their headquarters in other countries. As a result of this, the car plants are forced to compete with the other plants, who frequently have important wage cost advantages (Spain, France) or where labour unions have strong positions inside corporate decision-making structures (Sweden, Germany). The consequence of this situation was that the Belgian car plants have often been among the "pioneers" in such areas as new models of work organisation and working time flexibility (often forcing other plants in the European operations to follow suit). Coupled with high productivity, quality and flexibility, this situation has allowed the car industry in Belgium (which encompasses five companies: Ford, Opel, Renault, VW and Volvo) to secure a stable position.

Since a few years, however, this situation has changed, and many of the Belgian plants now find themselves in a situation where the advantages that they had previously negotiated with local management have become widely accepted standards. In this new set-up, other elements including cost, investment subsidies, product strategies and flexibility, militate against them. It is fair to say that the 1997 closure of the Renault plant most likely was the first example of a fundamental restructuring of the Belgian car industry: meanwhile VW Brussels has negotiated a radical WT agreement in 1998, and Opel Antwerp is currently trying to assure production volume beyond 2002. It is against this background that the current agreements have to be seen.

The agreements follow the normal bargaining calendar and are concluded for a period of 3-4 years by the company union people and the regional/local labour union officers. Several items reappear in all texts: working time reduction and flexibility, early retirement and negotiations on out- and in-sourcing. Ford and Opel, moreover, have explicit investment commitments written into their agreements.

The agreements in Belgium therefore have to be seen as attempts to consolidate the position of the plants in the European groups. The closure of Renault Vilvoorde, however, demonstrates that this may turn out to be a tenuous strategy: despite its pilot role inside the Renault group, management pushed through the closure in 1997 nonetheless.

(Table 1 here)

The agreements in comparative perspective

What is perhaps most apparent in this analysis of the different types of collective agreements in the car industries of five of the main European car producing industries (schematically represented in table 1), is that there is a wide array of different instruments being developed in the different countries. Most likely this is a result of the very different labour union structures as well as the prevailing institutions of collective bargaining: the strong works councils in the German car industry, for example, make them the obvious strategic agents, whereas the decentralised nature of labour relations and union structures in the UK or France make it very hard to pursue more co-ordinated strategies.

The second important observation is that there is very little co-ordination among the different initiatives. In Spain today, and in Belgium before the last crisis, the particular competitive advantages were exploited by unions to cushion their already relatively beneficial situation. However, as the Renault case illustrated, this strategy might backfire. Currently, all the unions in the European car industry are engaged in a similar competitive struggle, and it is likely that without more co-ordination of strategies and negotiations, the unions will simply be facing the same types of problems at every low point in the cycle. Table 1 lists the results of the analysis.

4.2. Company analyses

Since the problems in the European car industry are increasingly similar across different national industries, a purely national approach is bound to encounter limits: while it may be possible to retain competitive advantages for a certain period, the logic of international competition --between plants as much as between companies-- will rapidly lead to a situation where plants in other countries are forced to adopt similar, perhaps even farther-reaching measures. And, since labour is the only production factor that is supposed to be subject to change --because prices for parts as well as material are considered given on a world market-- the result is a downward competitive spiral of primary and secondary working conditions.

Only GM Europe has explicitly turned this competitive model into a new company philosophy, with the Template project,[2] but it is implicitly present in most of the negotiations in different countries during the last few years. It mattered in the Renault Vilvoorde debate, VW has an internal bench-marking model along similar lines, and most car companies prepare the production and launch of new models on the basis of internal comparisons of productivity, quality, delivery and cost.

This section will analyse recent agreements in two companies --GM Europe and Renault-- from this broader perspective. Contrary to section 4.1., which provided a static comparative perspective, this section will try to understand the dynamic aspects of the process of negotiating agreements that aim at securing production and employment. It will put the agreements in a broader perspective of increased inter-

[2] An excellent overview of the project and union responses can be found in (Eller-Braatz and Klebe 1998); Rehfeldt 1998 provides a relevant analysis of the Renault Vilvoorde crisis.

plant competition and competitive bench-marking, and will try to understand the competition on working conditions that is implicit in most agreements.

GM Europe

GM Europe has assembly plants in several European countries: Germany, where roughly 44000 workers are employed in four plants, the UK, with 9000 workers in two plants, Spain, where 9100 workers are employed in one plant, and Belgium, with 8000 workers in one plant. Since the early 1990s, the company has sought to modernise its European operations, and has adopted the strategy of experimenting in different areas in single plants and then generalise the results from these experiments to other. In the late 1980s, for example, a then revolutionary working time agreement was negotiated in Antwerp, including 10-hour shifts, which then became a benchmark for working time arrangements in other plants. And after the fall of the Berlin wall, the Eisenach plant in eastern Germany, which was built in 1991, rapidly became a laboratory for new models of work organisation. Since 1996, this approach to the optimisation of production was formalised and generalised through the TEMPLATE project, which aims at copying all the relevant best practice production, organisational and even architectural parameters exactly onto other plants.

This competitive bench-marking model provides the background for the agreements that were negotiated in the GM Europe plants in 1997 and 1998, and it is therefore no surprise that, despite the sometimes profoundly different union structures and bargaining traditions in the different countries, the agreements share many features.

The similarities are clearest when the agreements in Opel Germany and Belgium are compared. The agreements were concluded in January and March of 1998 and both secure employment, investment and production for the next five years, as well as a commitment by management to secure the future well beyond 2003 by planning the production of a new car in these countries. In exchange, the works council and unions agreed to a series of measures that are very similar in the two countries: an increase in working time flexibility through and expansion of the existing time corridor system, support in the search for productivity improvements, and lower wage increases than usual. In order to avoid layoffs during the period covered by the contract, the company and the unions will initiate voluntary measures such as

early retirement, part-time work and through the discussion of out- and insourcing measures.

As was to be expected, these arrangements had implications for other GM Europe plants. Literally a day after the agreement in Belgium was concluded, concern was voiced over the survival of the Vauxhall plant in Luton. Despite the lower wage costs in the UK, GM management maintained, car production was 30% more expensive there than on the continent. Two reasons were given: lower productivity and the unfavourable Sterling exchange rate. After a few critical days, unions and management agreed that the possible closure of the plant could be forestalled if production costs fell to the level of the German and Belgian plants. Moreover, both expected a shift in the government's exchange rate policy, which would contribute to the increased competitiveness of the plant. Thus the union accepted to participate in a massive drive to raise productivity by 30%; since wages already were relatively low in Vauxhall, no wage cuts were discussed, and working time flexibility was already on a par with arrangements in the other countries.

Even the Spanish operations follow, at least in part, this pattern. In Spain, Opel negotiated an extension of machine time through working time flexibility, including Saturday work, and management and the union will jointly monitor new investment projects to secure the long-term competitiveness of the Spanish plant.

As a result of these negotiations, Opel plants in different countries are slowly converging on the same principles of work organisation (teams) and working time (time corridors). In all plants, unions are engaged in productivity drives, and in exchange receive and discuss investment commitments for the future. Table 2 compares the different agreements.

(Table 2 here)

In order to understand how these different situations ended up in similar arrangements across the GM Europe operations, it is necessary to draw attention to the competitive dynamic at the basis of the process and how management was able to exploit that. For particular reasons, related to the acceptance by the workforce, the relative position of the unions, or the general situation, one plant would be picked out as a pilot on working time or work organisation. The agreement then con-

cluded in this "most favourable" setting is presented as a standard to every other plant, who has no alternative but to follow suit, else it might find itself in a less favourable position in the next round of model planning.

Renault

Over the last five years, since the onset of the crisis in the car industry, Renault has gone through an aggressive restructuring program. The origins of this restructuring program are found in the way the company was forced to deal with the financial crisis and virtual bankruptcy it went through in the early 1980s. Since that period, the company has adopted two broad lines in its reorganisation: the first was a consistent search for a lower break-even point, through massive workforce reductions (roughly 50% between 1984 and 1994) and increased outsourcing (currently Renault accounts for only roughly 16% of the value-added in a car); the second consisted of an aggressive new model line-up, which exploits the cost advantages of mass production with the rents associated with niches and is best seen in the generalisation, across market segments, of the *"monospace"* concept (found in the Espace, Scénic and Twingo).

These two strategies became the basis for the adjustment in the 1990s. After having roughly doubled labour productivity in final assembly and increased outsourcing, management adopted a plan to restructure production over different plants. Gradually, the Renault production network in France and abroad was to be turned into a network of single-model plants (meaning in practice plants which would predominantly produce one model), thus allowing for a more rational amortisation of investment costs. The agreements signed in the Renault group since 1992 have to be seen in the context of this broad management strategy. Increasing working time flexibility, which is a central element in all agreements, allows for a more focused investment strategy, and an investment write-off curve that follows demand more closely. Furthermore, since plants are assigned the production of specific models, the degree of flexibility, quality and the productivity level are crucial decision parameters for the future of investment.

The Renault agreements very clearly demonstrate how this competition between plants played out --and how it led to the dramatic closure of the Vilvoorde plant in 1997. The plant in Belgium (RIB) was the first to discuss a reorganisation of working time. In 1993, an agreement was negotiated, which allowed for different lev-

els of working time flexibility: 9 hours per day, 35 to 45 hours per week, 3 to 5 days per week, and a *de facto* fork of 13 to 21 days per month.

Responding to this initial agreement, other plants, primarily those in France, were forced to follow. Even though the agreements concluded in France did not adopt the wide-ranging forms of flexibility then found in Belgium, they accepted the principle of adapting working time to fluctuations in demand. In the same period, the Spanish Renault plants also began experimenting with new working time patterns: in 1993 and 1994, they negotiated an extension of machine time by working on 12 Saturdays a year. Thus, by 1996, almost all assembly plants in the Renault group were operating on a flexible working time schedule. Table 3 lists the most important elements of the current agreements.

(Table 3 here)

In 1996 and 1997 these developments took a tragic turn, when Renault announced the almost simultaneous closure of plants in Portugal and in Belgium and a social plan in France to reduce the Renault workforce by another 15000, spread over five years. Against the background of these brutal decisions, Renault management negotiated new working time agreements in all its French plants, in which many points which up until then had been highly problematic in the discussions with the labour unions --such as, for example, a third night shift, special week-end shifts and the generalisation of working time accounts-- were accepted, in order to safeguard production and employment and, prospectively, in a competitive bidding process to obtain production assignments for new models.

5. Evaluation

An evaluation of the agreements is difficult, in part because most of them were concluded only recently, and their actual short- as well as long-term effects are still somewhat hard to understand. On the whole, however, they seem to be relatively effective in safeguarding given employment levels in the short run. All texts guarantee a given employment level, and some even mention new hires. Moreover, the perhaps unavoidable workforce reductions in the future will be dealt with in a socially

responsible way through early retirement programs and part-time early retirement programs for the older workers.

Yet, as the dramatic Renault Vilvoorde closure, and to a lesser extent the Vauxhall Luton crisis suggest, the agreements are unable to solve the broader employment problem related to excess capacity. In both cases, the closure decision took place in the context of agreements securing employment in other plants. Since, in principle, all plants are in the same situation, those with the strongest national institutions --in the European context this refers primarily to the German works councils-- have the best hand in this game.

One important point is shared by all agreements: they are in essence management-driven, to the extent that unions react to or anticipate future management decisions. However, precisely because they are management-driven, they are also tools for management to reorganise companies according to its expectations --or better: their effects are, again, contingent upon the strength of national institutions or reflect the "national" concerns of management (closing another plant in France would, after the restructuring in the 1980s, been impossible for Renault management; hence the Portuguese and Belgian victims). This situation, then, is likely to lead to a process of progressive under-cutting of agreements reached elsewhere. Even the strong German Opel union and Works Council, for example, was forced to accept more working time flexibility and smaller wage increases in the agreements, in exchange for investment guarantees for the next five years.

This competitive underbidding is perhaps the most problematic aspect of the agreements: as long as only one plant has an advantage in management's eyes, its future may be relatively secure. When, however, the measures in these agreements are generalised across the entire European operations and thus *de facto* have become new standards, the competitive advantage has disappeared and only a new round, involving more concessions, will then be able to secure the plant's future.

In principle more co-ordination among unions in different countries could prevent this. The European Works Councils (EWC) set up in each of the companies, which would lead to more agreement on minimum standards to be adopted by all plant delegations in their negotiations. However, as the national comparisons demonstrated, most of the agreements follow national instead of European patterns.

6. Are alternative strategies possible?

Since these agreements, which aim at securing employment and investment, are typically defensive, short-term instruments and, perhaps most importantly of all, follow management's idea of company restructuring, unions may soon find themselves in the situation again that the agreements initially tried to avoid. The excess capacity problem may have been side-stepped for a while, but it has not disappeared. Thus the search for organisational and strategic alternatives becomes all the more urgent.

The premise of the alternatives discussed below is that they address the core of management's strategies. As discussed before, the main reason why working time assumed such a prominent place in the current situation, is that appears to provide a basis for linking management concerns for flexibility in order to write off heavy capital investments to union strategies of working time reduction as a way of safeguarding jobs. Such a link, however, engaged the unions in a regressive competitive spiral.

What follows starts by providing the outlines of an alternative strategy, located in the organisation of production and work, which avoids this increasingly impossible situation for labour unions, and which builds on the relatively simple idea that more people and less machines can do more cost-effectively what less people and more machines are doing now. The second section ties this organisational alternative into a broader EU-wide policy for industrial restructuring. The third section then develops the new role of the EWC in this strategy and how they have the potential to be the main agents of change in the multinational car companies.

6.1. Avoiding the squeeze: labour-intensive organisational alternatives

The central idea of organisational alternatives is that labour unions are not against the search for competitiveness—in fact, they are willing to support the manufacturers in it—but they are unwilling to accept that competitiveness can only be found in wages and working conditions with dire employment consequences.

The search for micro-organisational alternatives starts by dissociating the excess capacity problem and its employment effects. For employers this link is self-evident, since, given the technological level of the industry, for a given number of cars a „fixed“ (but increasingly smaller) number of working hours is necessary. Thus

a reduction in cars produced implies a reduction in the number of hours worked. What employers leave up to the unions, then (in the best case), is to decide whether work should be re-distributed among all those who work, or by sending workers into early retirement.

However, excess capacity does not necessarily express itself in reduced net employment. Excess capacity means simply that more cars can be made than can be sold; underemployment means that more labour is available than is necessary to make what needs to be produced. Up until now, manufacturers have unilaterally decided to adjust the volume of work—through layoffs or working time reorganisation—and leave the labour intensity (i.e. the ratio of labour to capital needed for the production of a car) untouched. The previous section analysed some of the problems with that strategy. Yet it is possible to reorganise production so that more workers are necessary for the same production volume. The question is how to do that without raising production costs.

To anyone thinking about the car industry two basic stylised facts are central. First, the turn toward lean production in the EU car industry over the last five to ten years has coincided with an increase in process standardisation (*„taylorisation“*), which ignores the skills basis that is available among (north-West) European car workers. Today, more skills are needed, not for actual use in production, but to solve problems that may emerge when „flexible“ machinery breaks down.

Car plants are extremely expensive: factory halls, assembly lines and robots are all more or less dedicated to particular models. When a company buys a machine, this is written off over the course of the product cycle, usually four or five years. Usually technology is either obsolete by then, or cannot be used for a new model, so a new one is purchased, which follows the same cycle. It is important to note that classical accounting conventions in many regards militate against workers, since investment in human resources is discounted as a cost or a tax in most cases. This explains in large measure why lean production techniques focus almost solely on labour productivity, i.e. reducing the amount of labour needed in production.

If we combine these two insights, an alternative micro-economic strategy seems to be possible, which invests less in machines and more in people, i.e. uses the flexibility inherent in the skills basis of the car workers to compensate for the lack of flexibility in (rigid) machinery. By substituting labour for machines, and thus raising

total factor productivity --even if labour productivity is slightly lower than in the current situation-- cars can be produced more cost-effectively, because capital investment is very low. In other words: even though labour productivity can be lower than in conventional assembly, implying that less cars can be built with more workers, but since fixed costs are considerably lower, overall production costs fall.[3]

The basic elements of such an alternative labour-intensive production model are not new. In fact, they build on a radical extension of demands that have long been on labour union agendas: decentralised team-work, stationary assembly of larger sub-modules, and high skills and thus higher wages. But it puts the "older" claims, which were mainly concerned with the quality of work, in a new perspective: sustaining employment in the face of dramatic excess capacity. Table 4 compares conventional "lean production" assembly with such a team-based high-skill production model, illustrating the potential for a broad new social pact in the industry. More details on actual cases where such an assembly method has been used, can be found in appendix 1 to this report.

As Table 4 suggests, this organisational model has another advantage, on the demand side: it allows for a product market strategy which is based on more flexibility, customisation and higher value added, so that --despite the possible lower production volume in the future (as a result of exogenous pressures, such as macro-economic evolution, environmental concerns and cultural evolution)-- profit margins per car increase. In other words, it is no longer necessary to increase volume to stabilise profit rates; in still other words, and here is the potential for a new social pact for the industry, employment as well as profits evolve independently of production volume.

(table 4 here)

The benefits of the model thus seem to be found in different areas: numerical and product flexibility; lower capital investment costs; the link to product development is easier to make; it works for high-end, quasi-customised cars, as well as for relatively simple mass produced cars.

[3] For more details on evaluating the costs and benefits of different production systems, see Engström, Jonsson et al. 1994; Engström, Jonsson et al. 1994.

6.2. Structural policy for restructuring: sectoral industrial policies

Politically, it is possible to link this micro-economic alternative to the existing industrial policies at the EU-level. The European commission has understood, it seems, the perverse effects of its policies: instead of support for regions in problems, structural fund money is increasingly used as a competitive subsidy to attract companies. In 1996 there was a short quarrel between EU-Commissioner Van Miert and the regional prime minister Kurt Biedenkopf in Sachsen; in 1997, after the announcement by Renault of the plant closure in Vilvoorde, Van Miert raised the issue again. This novel political sensitivity could be exploited by the labour unions, who could make this transfer of jobs –-not, it is important to emphasise, a net gain of jobs—a political issue. What seems necessary is a reorientation of EU structural policy that, instead of subsidising excess capacity, supports a re-tooling of the old plants to make better cars under better working conditions.

The EWCs could then become the place where the actual contents of such a re-tooling of existing plants is discussed. The often well-trained and experienced work force in the companies allows for the introduction of new, more complicated products, new assembly concepts such as the one presented above, and increased flexibility.

Such a new product market strategy has major implications in many areas, which require a place on the EWC agenda. It implies a revision of product development concepts: design for assembly is both a necessity and an opportunity, since it allows for a smoother incorporation of the assembly workers' ideas. This needs to be linked to alternatives in terms of work organisation (see below). Supplier policies as well need to change. In principle—this may well turn out to be a necessity—suppliers' organisation should also be reorganised to fit new products and assembly methods. Training methods need to provide even broader skills than found in many northern-European plants today.

In principle, all these areas could be treated in the EWC and its sub-commissions. Because of the agreements discussed in section 4, the situation is not critical: employment and production is, in most plants, secured for at least four years, which allows for a prospective treatment of these issues in the EWC.

6.3. A new role for European works councils

A survey conducted for the EMF in 1998 showed that for local unionists EWCs are an instrument to further work in their home plants. They are regarded as a useful tool for gathering information, and as a forum to understand the union and labour relations situation in other countries. In specific cases, meetings in the EWC even allowed unionists to put management claims about labour relations in plants in other countries in a better perspective. Yet importantly, the EWC and the surrounding union-only institutions were rarely used as a forum to co-ordinate union action across different plants in Europe.

Several studies have indicated that management has a different view of EWCs. For them, the EWC is a useful forum to explain corporate restructuring processes and marshal support for that. This is perhaps most obvious from the themes discussed during EWC meetings. More than half of the points on the agendas of EWC meetings deal with issues that generally fall outside the conventional domains of union negotiations or works councils: product market strategies, plant locations, supplier policies, investment plans, etc.

This comparison between management and union policies regarding EWCs suggests that the main problems with the EWC are related to the way they fit or do not fit into the existing union structures. Unionists from different countries see the value of a EWC primarily if not exclusively in what it can do to further union work “at home,” not in what it can do as a separate level of industrial relations alongside the plant and national structures. If unionists were able to use the EWC as a tool for dealing with other issues, often of a more strategic nature, the EWC activities would not any longer just feed into local work, but be truly complementary, helping unionists to deal with local issues when necessary, and treating broader issues --even from a position with “soft” information rights-- as well. Since management seems to be deploying the EWC in this broader way, the road is open for unionists to do the same.

Thus EWCs would gradually become forums for co-ordination across plants in different European countries, where minimum standards could be agreed either centrally or among unionists, so that the competitive underbidding process typical of the current situation could be halted. As with all such institutions which lack hard sanctioning capacities, it only works if all members participate: one defection would set a

new downward spiral in motion. Importantly, therefore, the preferences of all the union members have to be taken into account; a simple adoption of the "highest" standards would almost certainly lead to new tensions among unionists. Conversely, raising the minimum standards regarding working time and wages in the "lowest standard" countries also will create local incentives for competition on increase productivity and quality, a considerably more stable competitive model than cost-based competition.

Co-ordinating activities across different European plants then logically makes the EWC the appropriate forum for the implementation of EU structural policy for industrial restructuring. EU funding could be made dependent upon a plan for re-tooling agreed in the EWC, whereby the labour union representatives in the EWC push for a labour-intensive, high-skill organisational model along the lines sketched above.

Such a reorientation is less of a departure from current practice than one might think: today, the EWC is already a forum for discussions on industrial restructuring -- but primarily on management's terms. In order to avoid a social catastrophe in the car industry in the years to come, labour unions need to re-appropriate that domain. The strategic, policy and organisational alternatives outlines above, may make that possible.

7. Conclusion

This report has presented an analysis of the current situation in the EU car industry. Its main argument was that the excess capacity crisis that we are facing, requires new instruments and strategies in order to safeguard employment and keep the industry competitive.

The agreements, currently concluded, which aim at securing employment and investment, are important as means to stabilise the situation. However, in longer-term perspective, these agreements introduce a dimension of competition between plants and labour unions that is very likely to generate a downward competitive spiral. Consequently, alternatives have to go beyond the conventional approaches.

The report suggested such an alternative industrial model that consists of two elements: a search for a labour-intensive competitive model, which, by relying on

flexible workers' skills instead of expensive capital equipment, is more cost-competitive, and a European-level industrial policy to re-tool older plants. Such a model, which in essence builds on labour union demands for more and better work, allows us to avoid an employment crisis in the future --even in an age of structural excess capacity.

Appendix 1: Real-world examples of team-based, labour intensive assembly methods

(These examples are taken from Åke Sandberg ed. (1995) *Enriching Production. Perspectives on Volvo's Uddevalla plant as an alternative to lean production*. Aldershot, Avebury; and Christoph Midler (1993) *L'auto qui n'existait pas*. Paris, Intereditions)

Volvo Uddevalla

The Volvo plant in Uddevalla made cars without the use of an assembly line, but instead relied on small autonomous teams of highly-skilled workers who, in group, assembled an entire car. The plant closed in 1993 (and reopened last year under slightly different ownership), and most observers attributed the closure to the poor performance. A discussion ensued between researchers, and ultimately a consensus emerged that, measured by different methods, labour productivity in the Uddevalla was roughly on a par with that of other plants (MIT-IMVP researcher John-Paul Mac Duffie applied the standardised MIT methodology of „The Machine" to Uddevalla, and calculated that the plant's labour productivity was somewhere in the higher third of the observed plants).The Swedish researcher Berggren calculated a series of broader performance indicators, such as delivery time of customised cars, model change-over time and the range of options available to the customer, and argued that because of its inherent flexibility—every car is uniquely made—the plant can produce cars that can sell with much larger margins than comparable „inflexible" line assembly plants. To the labour productivity and the flexibility argument should be added that the initial capital investment in the plant is relatively small compared to traditional assembly lines, which sheds a different light on the economic advantages of the plant.

Some argue that this substitution of capital through labour is possible only in high-end cars, where customised flexibility matters; for small cars, this production model is impossible to implement: an assembly line does things more cheaply. The second example demonstrates that this argument is, at least in principle, incorrect.

Renault Twingo

In the development of the Twingo, Renault faced a problem that was new in the history of the company. For the first time in its history, production cost was the limiting variable (i.e. the method was „design to cost:" the market price of the vehicle was given and fixed, and all that followed had to be in line with that). This translated, among other things, in a whole series of simple savings among suppliers and machine-tool builders. But it also addressed a problem at the heart of this paper: some of the technical choices made on the Twingo were, in fact, beyond the initially planned budget. The reason was simply that because of the relatively high degree of automation, the planned factory would be more expensive than the Twingo budget initially envisaged. This was a hangover from the previous generation of product development systems, which started the industrialisation of a new model with a given technological plateau and then calculated how much the car should cost.

In order to deal with this problem, the industrialisation of the Twingo started from the opposite logic: given the budgetary **constraints**, the question became how to design a production system, that would meet the design-to-cost imperatives. The answer was provided by re-assessing every investment in terms of the ratio between cost and necessity. If a new machine (system) was more expensive, the engineers were told to search for (less expensive) alternatives. The way they did this was not by regularly dropping machines from a relatively fixed list, but by starting from a manual process and adding machines wherever it appeared more cost-efficient. As a result, assembling a Twingo requires considerably more manhours than the original industrial plan envisioned, but, in all, it is less expensive, because the capital investment has been kept to what appeared (given the time constraints of the Twingo project) necessary. Thus the difference between the planned and the actual investment in the plant that builds the engine has come down from an estimated FF 500 million to FF 170 million; even the body shop, for obvious reasons the most capital-intensive part of the factory, costs almost one-third less than initially planned: it is almost 20% less automated than the original plan projected.

Bibliography

Eller-Braatz, E. and T. Klebe (1998). “Benchmarking in der Automobilindustrie. Folgen für Betriebs- und Tarifpolitik am Beispiel General Motors Europe.” *WSI-Mitteilungen* **51**(7): 442-450.

Engström, T., D. Jonsson, and B. Johansson (1994). *Design Assumptions and Empirical Evidence Concerning Parallellized Long Work-Cycle Assembly. Human Factors in Organizational Design and Management* - Fourth Conference on Development, Introduction and Use of New Technology - Challenges for Human Organization and Human Resuource Development in a Changing World., Stockholm, North-Holland.

Engström, T., D. Jonsson, and L. Medbo (1994). *Development of Assembly Competence in Parallellized Flow Assembly Systems. Human Factors in Organizational Design and Management* - Fourth Conference on Development, Introduction and Use of New Technology - Challenges for Human Organization and Human Resuource Development in a Changing World., Stockholm, North-Holland.

Table 1: Agreements Securing Production Location and Employment: Comparative Analysis

	Germany	*United Kingdom*	*Spain*	*France*	*Belgium*
GOALS	link long-term competitiveness to employment security	deal with ad hoc crises Rover: new organisation	general collective agreements that cover an extension of production	increase working time flexibility to adjust to fluctuating demand	increase working time flexibility and experiment with new forms of work and supplier organisation
PERIOD	usually 1997-2000 Ford long-term	ad hoc	1997-2000	1997-2000	1997-1999/2000 Ford long-term
ACTORS	works council	local trade union officers	labour union sections	labour union sections	labour union sections and local union officers
FIELD OF APPLICATION	German operations of the company	plant-level; many are not included	Spanish operations of the companies	plant-level	plant-level
CONTENTS	• no layoffs • early retirement • career planning and training • smaller wage increases • investment commitments	• general commitment to support productivity drives • smaller wage increases • work organisation	• extension of production time , incl. Saturday and Sunday work • new hires • wage increases	• employment guarantees • working time reduction and flexibility	• working time reduction and flexibility • early retirement • out- and in-sourcing • investment commitments
GENERAL EVALUATION	anticipating possible relocation problems, unions use the German model of labour relations to influence the effects of management decisions	agreements deal with specific crises, and are negotiated at a decentralised level	no crisis anticipated; instead an extension of production is planned	reflection of both a concern for employment guarantees and a competitive bidding process to secure production of new models	attempts to safeguard production volume by conceding on working time and the organisation of production
TYPE OF AGREEMENTS	relatively homogeneous	very heterogeneous	relatively homogeneous	relatively homogeneous	relatively homogeneous

Table 2: Agreements securing employment and production in GM Europe

	Opel Germany	*Opel Belgium*	*Vauxhall*	*Opel Spain*
GOAL	secure employment and investment for 4 years	secure employment and investment over 5 years	secure employment for 6 years	normal collective bargaining
DATE	January 1998	March 1998	Spring 1998	Spring 1998
PERIOD	1998-2002	1998-2002	1998-2001	1998-2000
ACTORS	Group Works Council	plant-level union delegates and local union officers	local union officers	labour unions CCOO/UGT
NUMBER OF WORKERS COVERED	ca. 44000 in 4 plants	ca. 8000 in 1 plant	ca. 9000 in 2 plants	ca. 9100 in 1 plant
MEASURES	• no layoffs • investment commitments • working time flexibility • early retirement • sourcing • productivity drive • wage reductions	• no layoffs • investment commitments • working time flexibility • early retirement • sourcing • productivity drive	• working time flexibility and corridor system • commitment to support productivity drive (+30%)	• machine time extension • wage increases • union follow-up of investment plans

Table 3: Agreements securing employment and production in Renault

	Flins	*Douai*	*Sandouville*	*Cléon*	*FASA (E)*	*RIB (B)*
GOAL	Working time flexibility to deal with fluctuation in demand, explicit inter-plant competition	Working time flexibility to deal with fluctuation in demand, explicit inter-plant competition	Working time flexibility to deal with fluctuation in demand, explicit inter-plant competition	Working time flexibility to deal with fluctuation in demand, explicit inter-plant competition	Secure investment, production volume through working time flexibility aimed at increasing machine time	Working time flexibility to secure employment plus investment guarantees
DATE	(1992) 1996	(1992) 1997	1996	1996	1998	(1993) 1998
PERIOD	1997-2000	16 months, renewable	1996-97	open	1997-2000	1993 - open
ACTORS	CFTC, CGC, FO	CFDT, CGC, FO	CFTC, CGC, FO	CFTC, CGC, FO	CCOO, UGT	CCMB, CMB
NUMBER OF WORKERS COVERED	7500	5500	6500	4700	12500 over 3 plants	3400
MEASURES	• third shift in peak periods • working time flexibility through working time accounts • working time reduction • new hires	• third shift in peak periods • Saturday work • special week-end shifts (24 or 26-30 hrs) • working time accounts • working time reduction • new hires	• third shift in peak periods • 45h48' weekly working time in peak periods, over 6 days • working time accounts • new hires	• special week-end shifts (24 hrs) • working time accounts	• Saturday work • wage increases • new hires • increase in production volume	• working time flexibility (9hr day; 35-45 hr week; 3-5 days per week; 13-21 days per month) • no layoffs • investment guarantees

Table 4: Conventional and team-based assembly compared

Conventional assembly	*Team-based assembly*
• high fixed costs require high volume production	• low fixed costs reduce the importance of production volume
• fixed number of posts on the line reduce quantitative flexibility; hence working time as a strategic parameter	• autonomous teams allow high quantitative flexibility without working time flexibility
• relatively low skills, but high wages	• investment in human resources justify high wages
• detailed individual task descriptions result in efficiency losses	• complementary, parallel job design allows for efficiency gains
• necessary standardisation of products and parts leads to a low qualitative flexibility, and indirectly to price wars among producers	• high qualitative flexibility allows for customised products, which can be sold with higher profit margins

BÜCHER
DES FORSCHUNGSSCHWERPUNKTS
ARBEITSMARKT UND BESCHÄFTIGUNG
(nur im Buchhandel erhältlich)

Bettina Bangel
Geographie der Altersgrenzen.
Frühverrentung im regionalen Strukturwandel
1993, Berlin, edition sigma, 251 Seiten

Friedrich Buttler, Wolfgang Franz, Ronald Schettkat, and David Soskice
Institutional Frameworks and Labor Market Performance. Comparative Views on the U.S. and German Economies
1995, London/New York, Routledge,
352 Seiten

European Academy of the Urban Environment
New institutional arrangements in the labour market. Transitional labour markets as a new full employment concept
1998, Berlin, EA.UE series „The Urban Environment in Europe“, 135 Seiten

Gernot Grabher (Ed.)
The Embedded Firm
On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks
1993, London/New York, Routledge, 306 Seiten

Gernot Grabher
Lob der Verschwendung
1994, Berlin, edition sigma, 144 Seiten

Gernot Grabher / David Stark (Eds.)
Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism. Legacies, Linkages and Localities
1997, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 360 Seiten

Hubert Heinelt / Gerhard Bosch / Bernd Reissert (Hrsg.)
Arbeitsmarktpolitik nach der Vereinigung
1994, Berlin, edition sigma, 249 Seiten

Hitchens, D.M.W.N. / Wagner, K. / Birnie, J.E.
East German Productivity and the Transition to the Market Economy
1993, Aldershot, Avebury, 126 Seiten

Hansjörg Herr / Andreas Westphal (Hrsg.)
Transformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Makroökonomische Konzepte und Fallstudien
1993, Frankfurt/New York, Campus, 370 Seiten

Traute Meyer
Ungleich besser? Die ökonomische Unabhängigkeit von Frauen im Zeichen der Expansion sozialer Dienstleistungen
1997, Berlin, edition sigma, 216 Seiten

Mirjana Morokvasic / Hedwig Rudolph (Hrsg.)
Wanderungsraum Europa. Menschen und Grenzen in Bewegung
1994, Berlin, edition sigma, 286 Seiten

Frieder Naschold / David Soskice / Bob Hancké / Ulrich Jürgens (Hg.)
Ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit und Institutionelle Innovation
WZB-Jahrbuch 1997
1997, Berlin, edition sigma, 366 Seiten

Jacqueline O'Reilly
Banking on Flexibility
1994, Aldershot, Avebury, 297 Seiten

Jacqueline O’Reilly / Colette Fagan (Eds.)
Part-Time Prospects. An International Comparison
1998, London/New York, Routledge, 304 Seiten

Sigrid Quack
Dynamik der Teilzeitarbeit.
Implikationen für die soziale Sicherung von Frauen
1993, Berlin, edition sigma, 289 Seiten

Hedwig Rudolph / Mirjana Morokvasic (Eds.)
Bridging States and Markets.
International Migration in the Early 1990s
1993, Berlin, edition sigma, 330 Seiten

Hedwig Rudolph (Hg.)
unter Mitarbeit von Dagmar Simon
Geplanter Wandel, ungeplante Wirkungen.
Handlungslogiken und -ressourcen im Prozeß der Transformation
WZB-Jahrbuch 1995
1995, Berlin, edition sigma, 348 Seiten

Ronald Schettkat (Ed.)
The Flow Analysis of Labour Markets
1996, London/New York, Routledge, 294 Seiten

Günther Schmid (Ed.)
Labor Market Institutions in Europe.
A Socioeconomic Evaluation of Performance
1994, New York/London, M.E. Sharpe, 291 Seiten

Günther Schmid
Är full sysselsättning fortfarande möjlig? Övergångsarbetsmarknader som en ny strategi för arbetsmarknadspolitiken.
(Übersetzung: Birger Viklund)
1995, Södertäje, PM Bäckström Förlag, 53 Seiten

Günther Schmid / Jacqueline O'Reilly /
Klaus Schömann (Eds.)
International Handbook of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation
1996, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 954 Seiten

Klaus Schömann
The Dynamics of Labor Earnings over the Life Course. A Comparative and Longitudinal Analysis of Germany and Poland
1994, Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung: Studien und Berichte, Bd. 60, Berlin, edition sigma,190 Seiten

Klaus Schömann / Ralf Rogowski /
Tomas Kruppe
Labour Market Efficiency in the European Union. Employment Protection and Fixed-Term Contracts
1998, London/New York, Routledge, 214 Seiten

zukunft im zentrum, Service-Gesellschaft für Beschäftigungs- und Qualifizierungsberatung / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (Hrsg.)
Arbeitslandschaft Europa. Bericht zum Zweiten Europäischen Arbeitsmarktkongress
The European Labor Landscape. Report on the Second European Labor Market Congress
Berlin 1994
Vertrieb: zukunft im zentrum gGmbH, Rungestraße 19, D-10179 Berlin, Schutzgebühr: 20,-- DM, 328 Seiten

DISCUSSION PAPERS 1995

Abteilung:
Organisation und Beschäftigung

FS I 95 - 101
Sigrid Quack, Jacqueline O'Reilly,
Swen Hildebrandt
New Patterns of Recruitment and Training in German, UK and French Banks. An examination of the tensions between sectoral and national systems

FS I 95 - 102
Sigrid Quack, Swen Hildebrandt
Hausbank or Fournisseur? Bank Services for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Germany and France

FS I 95 - 103
Sigrid Quack, Swen Hildebrandt
Das Geheimnis der Banken - Zum Einfluß von Organisationsstrukturen und Personalpolitiken deutscher und französischer Kreditinstitute im mittelständischen Unternehmensgeschäft

Abteilung:
Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Beschäftigung

FS I 95 - 201
Klaus Schömann
Active Labour Market Policy in the European Union

FS I 95 - 202
Sylvia Matheus
Dienstleistungsarbeit als Auffangnetz? Eine Analyse der Eintritte und Wechsel in Dienstleistungsarbeit mit Daten des Sozioökonomischen Panels

FS I 95 - 203
Colette Fagan, Janneke Plantenga, Jill Rubery
Does Part-Time Work Promote Sex Equality? A Comparative Analysis of the Netherlands and the UK

FS I 95 - 204
Klaus Semlinger
Arbeitsmarktpolitik für Existenzgründer. Plädoyer für eine arbeitsmarktpolitische Unterstützung des Existenzgründungsgeschehens

FS I 95 - 205
Hugh Mosley, Thomas Kruppe and Stephan Speckesser
Flexible Adjustment through Short-time Work: A Comparison of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain

FS I 95 - 206
Birgitta Rabe
Implementation wirtschaftsnaher Arbeitsmarktpolitik - Lohnkostenzuschüsse nach § 249h Arbeitsförderungsgesetz in Berlin und Sachsen

FS I 95 - 207
Klaus Schömann, Ralf Rogowski, Thomas Kruppe
Fixed Term Contracts and Labour Market Efficiency in the European Union

FS I 95 - 208
Claudia Spee und Günther Schmid
Beschäftigungsdynamik in Ballungsregionen. Entwicklung und Struktur der Beschäftigung des Berliner Arbeitsmarktes in Ballungsraumvergleich 1977-94

FS I 95 - 209
Nigel Meager
Arbeitsmarktpolitik für Existenzgründer. Internationale Erfahrungen der Existenzgründungsförderung von Arbeitslosen

Abteilung:
Wirtschaftswandel und Beschäftigung

FS I 95 - 301
Wendy Carlin, Peter Richthofen
Finance, Economic Development and the Transition: The East German Case

FS I 95 - 302
Andrew Glyn
Social Democracy and Full Employment

FS I 95 - 303
Andrew Glyn
Unemployment and Inequality

FS I 95 - 304
Ronald Schettkat
Asymmetric Labor Market Flows over the Business Cycle

FS I 95 - 305
Wendy Carlin and Colin Mayer
Structure and Ownership of East German Enterprises

FS I 95 - 306
Andres Glyn
Does Profitability *Really* Matter?

FS I 95 - 307
Andrea Boltho, Wendy Carlin,
Pasquale Scaramozzino
Will East Germany Become a New Mezzogiorno?

FS I 95 - 308
Sigurt Vitols
Are German Banks Different?

FS I 95 - 309
Sigurt Vitols
German Banks and the Modernization of the Small Firm Sector: Long-Term Finance in Comparative Perspective

FS I 95 - 310
Sigurt Vitols
Corporate Governance Versus Economic Governance: Banks and Industrial Restructuring in the U.S. and Germany

FS I 95 - 311
Sigurt Vitols
Financial Systems and Industrial Policy in Germany and Great Britain: The Limits of Convergence

FS I 95 - 312
Sigurt Vitols
Inflation Versus Central Bank Independence? Banking Regulation and Financial Stability in the U.S. and Germany

FS I 95 - 313
Thomas R. Cusack
Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989

FS I 95 - 314
Steven Casper
How Public Law Influences Decentralized Supplier Network Organization in Germany: The Cases of BMW and Audi

FS I 95 - 315
Thomas R. Cusack
Politics and Macroeconomic Performance in the OECD Countries

DISCUSSION PAPERS 1996

Abteilung:
Organisation und Beschäftigung

FS I 96 - 101
Swen Hildebrandt
Berufsausbildung in Frankreich zwischen Staat, Region und Unternehmen:
Neuere Entwicklungen in der Region Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur

FS I 96 - 102
Dorothee Bohle
Governance im Spätsozialismus. Die Herausbildung hybrider Koordinationsformen und informeller Vernetzungen in Polen und Ungarn in den achtziger Jahren

FS I 96 - 103
Felicitas Hillmann / Hedwig Rudolph
Jenseits des brain drain - Zur Mobilität westlicher Fach- und Führungskräfte nach Polen

FS I 96 - 104
Gernot Grabher
***Neue* Bundesländer?**
Zur Rolle des historischen Erbes in der Reorganisation von Betrieben und Regionen in Brandenburg

FS I 96 - 105
Philippe Bernoux
Das Unternehmen - ein neues soziologisches Forschungsobjekt in Frankreich?

FS I 96 - 106
Frauke Miera
Zuwanderer und Zuwanderinnen aus Polen in Berlin in den 90er Jahren.
Thesen über Auswirkungen der Migrationspolitiken auf ihre Arbeitsmarktsituation und Netzwerke

Abteilung:
Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Beschäftigung

FS I 96 - 201
Willem J. Dercksen / Jaap de Koning
The New Public Employment Service in the Netherlands (1991-1994)

FS I 96 - 202
Peter Auer with Thomas Kruppe
Monitoring of Labour Market Policy in the EU-Member States

FS I 96 - 203
Jacqueline O'Reilly
Theoretical Considerations in Cross-National Employment Research

FS I 96 - 204
Günther Schmid
Reform der Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Vom fürsorgenden Wohlfahrtsstaat zum kooperativen Sozialstaat

FS I 96 - 205
Peter Auer / Stefan Speckesser
unter Mitarbeit von Lothar Linke
Labour Markets and Organisational Change
Future Working Structures for an Ageing Workforce

FS I 96 - 205a
Peter Auer / Stefan Speckesser
unter Mitarbeit von Lother Linke
Arbeitsmarkt- und Organisationswandel: Zukünftige Arbeitsstrukturen und ältere Arbeitnehmer

FS I 96 - 206
Günther Schmid
unter Mitarbeit von Maja Helmer
Beschäftigungswunder Niederlande?
Ein Vergleich der Beschäftigungssysteme in den Niederlanden und in Deutschland

FS I 96 207
Philip O'Connell and Fran McGinnity
What Works, Who Works? The Impact of Active Labour Market Programmes on the Employment Prospects of Young People in Ireland

Abteilung:
Wirtschaftswandel und Beschäftigung

FS I 96 - 301
Bob Hancké
Industrial Reorganisation in France. Changing relationships between large and small firms

FS I 96 - 302
Bob Hancké
The Political Economy of Organizational Change. Industrial Restructuring and Industrial Relations in France: *Le Cas Renault*

FS I 96 - 303
Bob Hancké / David Soskice
Coordination and Restructuring in Large French Firms. The Evolution of French Industry in the 1980s.

FS I 96 - 304
Elisabetta Gualmini
Policy Innovation in the Italian Labour Market: The influence of institutions

FS I 96 - 305
Richard Hyman
Institutional Transfer: Industrial Relations in Eastern Germany

FS I 96 - 306
Steven Casper
German Industrial Associations and the Diffusion of Innovative Economic Organization: The Case of JIT Contracting

FS I 96 - 307
Mark Lehrer
The German Model of Industrial Strategy in Turbulence: Corporate Governance and Managerial Hierarchies in Lufthansa

FS I 96 - 308
Isabela Mares
Firms and the Welfare State: The Emergence of New Forms of Unemployment

FS I 96 - 309
Bob Hancké
Labour Unions, Business Co-ordination and Economic Adjustment in Western Europe, 1980-90

FS I 96 - 310
David Soskice / Bob Hancké
Von der Konstruktion von Industrienormen zur Organisation der Berufsausbildung. Eine vergleichende Analyse am Beispiel von Großbritannien, Deutschland, Japan und Frankreich

FS I 96 - 311
Bob Hancké / Sylvie Cieply
Bridging the Finance Gap for Small Firms. The role of information flows across large firm-based production networks in supplying finance to small firms: the case of France

FS I 96 - 312
John Phillimore
Restructuring Australian Industrial Relations: The Limits of a Supply Side Approach

FS I 96 - 313
Bob Hancké / Steven Casper
ISO 9000 in the French and German Car Industry. How international quality standards support varieties of capitalism

FS I 96 - 314
Isabela Mares
Is Unemployment Insurable? Employers and the Institutionalization of the Risk of Unemployment

FS I 96 - 315
Torben Iversen
The Political Economy of Inflation: Bargaining structure or central bank independence?

FS I 96 - 316
Mark K. Cassell
The Treuhandanstalt, Privatization and the Role of the Courts

FS I 96 - 317
Pepper D. Culpepper
Problems on the Road to "High-Skill": A sectoral lesson from the transfer of the dual system of vocational training to eastern Germany

FS I 96 - 318
Sylvain Broyer
The Social Market Economy: Birth of an Economic Style

FS I 96 - 319
David Soskice
German Technology Policy, Innovation, and National Institutional Frameworks

FS I 96 - 320
Karl-Orfeo Fioretos
How and Why Institutional Advantages are Preserved in a Global Economy: A Comparison of British and Swedish Multilateral Preferences

FS I 96 - 321
Sigurt Vitols
German Industrial Policy: An Overview

FS I 96 - 322
Steven Casper
The Development of Decentralized Supplier Networks in East Germany: A Challenge to the German Model of Industrial Organization

FS I 96 - 323
Richard Deeg
German Banks and Industrial Finance in the 1990s

DISCUSSION PAPERS 1997

Abteilung:
Organisation und Beschäftigung

FS I 97 - 101
Felicitas Hillmann / Hedwig Rudolph
Redistributing the Cake? Ethnicisation Processes in the Berlin Food Sector

FS I 97 -102
Dorothee Bohle
Zwischen lokaler Anarchie und globalen Netzen: Transformationsprozesse im polnischen Straßengüterverkehr

FS I 97 - 103
Felicitas Hillmann
This is a migrant's world: Städtische ethnische Arbeitsmärkte am Beispiel New York City

FS I 97 - 104
Sigrid Quack
Karrieren im Glaspalast. Weibliche Führungskräfte in europäischen Banken

FS I 97 - 105
Enzo Mingione
The Current Crisis of Intensive Work Regimes and the Question of Social Exclusion in Industrialized Countries

Abteilung:
Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Beschäftigung

FS I 97 - 201
Dirk Finger
Dienstleistungsschecks in Europa - ein Modell für Deutschland? Beschäftigungseffekte und Kosten für die Volkswirtschaft: fünf Szenarien

FS I 97 - 201a
Dirk Finger
Service cheques in Europe - a model for Germany? Employment effects and macroeconomic costs: five scenarios

FS I 97 - 202
Günther Schmid
in collaboration with Maja Helmer
The Dutch Employment Miracle? A comparison of employment systems in the Netherlands and Germany

FS I 97 - 203
Günther Schmid, Peter Auer, Hugh Mosley, Klaus Schömann (Eds.)
Progress in Evaluation Research: Documentation of Two Transfer-Workshops on the „International Handbook of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation"

FS I 97 - 204
Günther Schmid, Klaus Schömann und Holger Schütz
Evaluierung der Arbeitmarktpolitik. Ein analytischer Bezugsrahmen am Beispiel des Arbeitsmarktpolitischen Rahmenprogramms in Berlin

FS I 97 - 205
Silke Bothfeld
Teilzeitarbeit für alle? Eine Untersuchung von Teilzeitpräferenzen in Deutschland und Großbritannien unter beschäftigungspolitischen Gesichtspunkten

FS I 97 - 206
Ralf Rogowski und Günther Schmid
Reflexive Deregulierung. Ein Ansatz zur Dynamisierung des Arbeitsmarkts

FS I 97 - 206a
Ralf Rogowski and Günther Schmid
Reflexive Deregulation. International experiences and proposals for labour market reform

FS I 97 - 207
Jacqueline O'Reilly, Claudia Spee
Regulating work and welfare of the future: Towards a new social contract or a new gender contract?

FS I 97 - 208
Hugh Mosley and Stefan Speckesser
Market Share and Market Segment of Public Employment Services

Abteilung:
Wirtschaftswandel und Beschäftigung

FS I 97 - 301
Mark Lehrer, Owen Darbishire
The Performance of Economic Institutions in a Dynamic Environment: Air Transport and Telecommunications in Germany and Britain

FS I 97 - 302
Stewart Wood
Weakening Codetermination?
Works Council Reform in West Germany in the 1980s

FS I 97 - 303
Thomas R. Cusack
On the Road to Weimar? The Political Economy of Popular Satisfaction with Government and Regime Performance in Germany

FS I 97 - 304
Bob Hancké
Modernisation Without Flexible Specialisation. How large firm restructuring and government regional policies became the step-parents of autarchic regional production systems in France

FS I 97 - 305
Mark Tilton
Regulatory Reform and Market Opening in Japan

FS I 97 - 306
Thomas R. Cusack
Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy

FS I 97 - 307
Peter A. Hall /
Robert J. Franzese, Jr.
Mixed Signals:
Central Bank Independence,
Coordinated Wage Bargaining,
and European Monetary Union

FS I 97 - 308
David Soskice and Torben Iversen
Central Bank - Trade Union Interactions and the Equilibrium Rate of Employment

Assoziiertes Arbeitsgebiet: Internationale Politik

P 97 - 301
Wolf-Dieter Eberwein
Die Politik Humanitärer Hilfe: Im Spannungsfeld von Macht und Moral

P 97 - 302
Yasemin Topçu
Die Neugestaltung staatlicher humanitärer Hilfe in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

P 97 - 303
Wolf-Dieter Eberwein
Umwelt - Sicherheit - Konflikt
Eine theoretische Analyse

P 97 - 304
Peter Brecke
Using Pattern Recognition to Identify Harbinger Configurations of Early Warning Indicators

DISCUSSION PAPERS 1998

Abteilung:
Organisation und Beschäftigung

FS I 98 - 101
Hildegard Theobald
Frauen in leitenden Positionen in der Privatwirtschaft. Eine Untersuchung des schwedischen und deutschen Geschlechtervertrages

FS I 98 - 102
Isabel Georges
Heterogeneity versus homogeneity?
Transformation of wage relations of the French and the German public telephone operators: the case of directory inquiry services

FS I 98 - 103
Dieter Plehwe (Hg.)
Transformation der Logistik

FS I 98 - 104
Sigrid Quack
Reorganisation im Bankensektor.
Neue Chancen für Frauen im Management?

FS I 98 - 105
Janne Tienari, Sigrid Quack
and Hildegard Theobald
Organizational Reforms and Gender: Feminization of Middle Management in Finnish and German Banking

Abteilung:
Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Beschäftigung

FS I 98 - 201
Dietmar Dathe
Wechselwirkungen zwischen Arbeitszeitpolitik und Arbeitsangebotsverhalten. Eine Untersuchung zur Bedeutung von Arbeitspräferenzen für eine Politik der Arbeitsumverteilung

FS I 98 - 202
Ton Wilthagen
Flexicurity: A New Paradigm for Labour Market Policy Reform

FS I 98 - 203
Klaus Schömann, Thomas Kruppe und Heidi Oschmiansky
Beschäftigungsdynamik und Arbeitslosigkeit in der Europäischen Union

FS I 98 - 204
Jacqueline O'Reilly, Ralf Rogowski (Hg./Eds.)
Dokumentation des Round-Table Gesprächs „Die neue Labour-Regierung in Großbritannien: Zwischenbilanz der ersten hundert Tage"
„The New Labour Government in Great Britain: Assessment of the first 100 days"

FS I 98 - 205
Holger Schütz, Stefan Speckesser, Günther Schmid
Benchmarking Labour Market Performance and Labour Market Policies: Theoretical Foundations and Applications

FS I 98 - 206
Günther Schmid
Transitional Labour Markets: A New European Employment Strategy

Abteilung:
Wirtschaftswandel und Beschäftigung

FS I 98 - 301
Karin Wagner
The German Apprenticeship System after Unification

FS I 98 - 302
Donatella Gatti
The Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment in Varying Micro-Institutional Settings

FS I 98 - 303
Steven Casper
The Legal Framework for Corporate Governance: Explaining the Development of Contract Law in Germany and the United States

FS I 98 - 304
Torben Iversen and Thomas R. Cusack
The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?

FS I 98 - 305
Bob Hancké
Industrial Restructuring and Industrial Relations in the European Car Industry. Instruments and Strategies for Employment

Beim Präsidenten
Arbeitsgebiet: Internationale Politik

P 98 - 301
Wolf Dieter Eberwein
Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen: Integrationstheoretische Überlegungen

P 98 - 302
Wolf-Dieter Eberwein
Sven Chojnacki
Disasters and Violence, 1946-1997. The link between the natural and the social environment

P 98 - 303
Catherine Götze
Humanitäre Organisationen und Zivilgesellschaft. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zum zivilgesellschaftlichen Charakter von Nichtregierungsorganisationen

P 98 - 304
Ortwin Renn und Andreas Klinke
Risikoevaluierung von Katastrophen

Absender/From:

Versandstelle - WZB

Reichpietschufer 50

D-10785 Berlin

B E S T E L L S C H E I N

O R D E R F O R M

Bitte schicken Sie mir aus Ihrer Publikationsliste folgende Diskussions-Papiere zu.

Bitte schicken Sie bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers ***unbedingt*** eine ***1 DM-Briefmarke pro paper*** und einen an Sie adressierten ***Aufkleber*** mit. Danke.

For each paper you order please send a "***Coupon-Réponse International***" (international money order) plus a ***self-addressed adhesive label.*** Thank You.

Please send me the following discussion papers from your Publication List:

Paper No. Author

_____